Abstract: In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), available nodes must act as their own router and also rely on other nodes to relay communication packets. However, some intermediate nodes may refuse to forward packets to other nodes or discard route-discovery requests from others to save power, as much as those consumed during the message transmission phase. In order to prevent node selfishness, we have proposed a novel approach to message security using a payment-based mechanism in MANETs. In this way, the proposed routing protocol with payment mechanism not only avoids the selfish nodes that may refuse to route packets, but also restrains the nodes from sending useless packets into the networks. Finally, the proposed payment mechanism ensures ad hoc communications in a selfless environment by providing economic encouragement to enforce node cooperation in MANETs. 
eavesdropping, active tampering, interfering, and spamming. Therefore, in order to ensure the security of two communication nodes, a protocol must enable a destination node to identify the source of a given message, and the source node must be able to authenticate the legal destination node (Wei, Hwang, and Chin, 2011) . A reliable network is essential to ensure a quality service. However, as many mobile devices such as PDAs that use MANETs do have limited power (Shin and Weiss, 2010) , (Shin and Weiss, 2010) , because some intermediate nodes may refuse to route packets to a destination or directly discard route-discovery requests from others to save power. Over the course of time, this type of stop forwarding attack may lead nodes in the network to be uncooperative and selfish. To overcome the above situations, we have integrated the payment-based concept into a routing protocol to encourage node cooperation in MANETs. The payment-based scheme (Buttyan and Hubaux, 2003) has the ability to promote better performances by providing economic encouragement. Most research concerned with this area have focused on two types in MANETs, namely (1) packet purse model (PPM) and (2) packet trade model (PTM). In the PPM, the source node pays for the request and the intermediate nodes all gain from it. Alternatively, in the PTM, the intermediate node buys the packet from its ancestor node and sells it to the successor node on the route. Finally, the destination node receives the message by buying the packet from its ancestor node. The PPM restrains the nodes from sending the useless packets into networks, and prevents networks from packet flooding attacks. On the contrary, PTM is vulnerable to packet flooding attacks because the malevolent nodes may send a large number of useless packets into a network to obtain the financial incentive. As a result, our proposed protocol focuses on the PPM and integrates it into a routing algorithm. Moreover, our proposed protocol maintains the following essential requirements:
• For MANETs security, it is important to provide mutual authentication, data confidentiality, and integrity between the two communicating nodes. Therefore, ad hoc nodes have to generate the dynamic session keys to secure the communications in MANETs. Moreover, participant nodes must have light overheads in terms of computational costs, and high efficiency.
• Preventing active tampering attacks, that is, no one can alter a message to damage the security of MANETs. If a malicious node on the route tampers with the packet, it can be detected and identified by running a detection of malicious intermediate nodes.
• Providing non-repudiation, that is, it not only leads to identification of the sources of received information, but also prevents a sender from denying a sent message if it has done so. As a result, the non-repudiation can prevent impersonation attacks, in other words, an intruder cannot pretend to be a legitimate node.
To the best of our knowledge, the research done in this paper is the first attempt to provide a secure communications model with mutual authentication, key establishment protocol, detection of malicious intermediate nodes, and prevention of node selfishness in mobile ad hoc networks. Since a payment-based routing protocol also requires the cryptographic encryption and verification, we used the Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme (Boneh and Franklin, 2001) to reduce the overhead of verifying certificates every time. In identity-based cryptography, there is no need for users to maintain other users' public key certificates, and the publicly known identity of a user can be used to derive the public key of the user. Our protocol assumes that the network has a Key Generator Center (KGC), which is trusted by all nodes in the network. In addition, a KGC is used for generating a master key and other necessary parameters for authorized nodes to form a secure MANET environment. This will be further described in Section 2.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We will first discuss the related works and their limitations in Section 2. In Section 3 we will present a secure routing protocol with payment mechanism. In Section 4, security analysis is presented; followed by our conclusions in Section 5.
Related works
To ensure safety, routing is a critical issue in MANETS because of its special characteristics and a number of secure routing protocols have been proposed (Hassan, El-Aziz, and El-Radi, 2010) , (Hsu and Chang, 2009) , (Hu, Perrig and Johnson, 2002) , , (Papadimitratos and Haas, 2002) , (Papadimitratos and Haas, 2003) , (Park, Song, Lee, Kim, Lee and Moon, 2007) , (Xia and Wang, 2006) for MANETs, such as SRP (Papadimitratos and Haas, 2002) , SEAD (Hu, Perrig and Johnson, 2002) , SMT (Papadimitratos and Haas, 2003) , DIMH (Xia and Wang, 2006) , SRDP (Park, Song, Lee, Kim, Lee and Moon, 2007) , SDMP (Othman and Mokdad, 2010) , and RSSRE (Yu, Guo, Wang and Liu, 2009) . They are generally classified into two categories: reactive and proactive protocols. In reactive protocols (also called source-initiated on-demand driven protocols), routing data does not need to be periodically maintained and related routing data is initiated whenever the packets are required to be sent. On the other hand, in proactive protocols (also called table-driven protocols), participating nodes are required to periodically maintain and update routing data and to store it in their own routing tables, even if no packets are required to be sent. These protocols are integrated with some protective mechanisms for enhancing the confidentiality of transmitted messages between two communication nodes such as message encryption, node authentication, multipath routing, reputation/trust evaluation and anonymous routing.
For QoS routing, it requires not only to find a path from the source node to the destination node, but a path that satisfies the end to stop QoS bandwidth/delay/packet loss requirements for real-time applications (such as audio, video, etc.). The work developed in (Du, 2004) draws up the issue of a MANET wishing to provide a maximum available bandwidth in a given path, while having a lower packet delay and a higher throughput than AODV (Perkins and Royer, 1999) . The idea in (Wu and Jia, 2007) is based on the concept of multiple paths, or multiple trees, to meet the bandwidth requirement of a call. Each node maintains its local routing information without maintaining the global information of the network topology, and thus the network resources can be better utilized.
The reputation/trust mechanism is built based on ad hoc nodes that have shown benign behaviors will get a better service from their peers by awarding a better reputation or trust. The work (Narula, Dhurandher, Misra and Woungang, 2008) proposes a novel method of message security by using the trust levels into multipath routing algorithm to avoid non-trusted routes that may use brute force attacks. The authors in (Yu, Guo, Wang and Liu, 2009 ), that present a reputationbased routing scheme for hierarchical ad hoc networks and the cluster head, act as the reputation manager for updating reputation information with different roles. Thus, the malicious nodes would be isolated for safeguard routing security.
In order to stimulate the nodes for packet forwarding, authors in (Buttyan and Hubaux, 2003) assume that every node has a tamper resistant security module (such as a smart card) and the security module maintains a counter, called nuglet counter. The nuglet counter is increased by one when the intermediate node forwards a packets for the benefit of other nodes and the nuglet counter is decreased by n when the source node wants to send its own packets, where n is the number of intermediate nodes needed to reach the destination and nuglet counter required to remain always positive. However, all the routing packets between the involved participants are protected by the session key and thus the security requirement of data non-repudiation cannot be provided. The integrity of a received packets can be verified only by an intermediate node and the intermediate node cannot prove the source of the received packets to any third party. Without guarantee the validity of sender's transmission behavior, a source node may deny its forwarding requests.
A secure routing protocol with payment mechanism
In this section, we proposed our secure routing protocol with substantial payment for MANETs. It is aimed to prevent active attacks, such as stop forwarding and tampering attacks in which malicious nodes could alter packets in transit and damage network communication. Before presenting the details of our paymentbased routing protocol, we must outline some basic notations and assumptions, as seen in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. The whole protocol consists of three phases: a path discovery phase, a path reverse phase, and a data transfer phase with payment mechanism. In general, a routing protocol consists of three types of participants: source node N 0 , destination node N n , and intermediate nodes N i , where i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. The source node initiates a path discovery phase from itself to the destination node by sending a P athDiscovery message through a number of intermediate nodes. Then, the destination node responds with a P athReverse message in the reverse direction until it reaches the source node, verifying the complete route. For the data transfer phase, N 0 sends a confidential message M to N n through a number of intermediate nodes, and the involved intermediate nodes along the route may demand to be paid for forwarding packets to the successor node until M reaches N n . As a result, N 0 will generate n − 1 pieces of N uglet and pay them for the involved intermediate nodes, where N uglet is the virtual currency. In addition, all messages transmitted between nodes should be verified and protected in the protocol. Thus even if adversaries could eavesdrop on the communications between nodes, or inject false packets into networks, the A static shared key between node N i and node N j , where
H 2 (.) A public and collision-free hash function, where
n .
M AC The message authentication code and is defined by
where m denotes the message under the protection key of k. N uglet i,j A virtual currency which is generated by node i and node i paid N uglet i,j to node j for the services. protocol would provide an adequate level of security. In the following subsection, each phase is described in detail.
Path discovery phase
Initially, whenever a source node N 0 attempts to securely establish an available route path from itself to the destination node N n , it would first generate a unique tag#, and then initiates a path discovery procedure within the network to find a feasible route by performing the following operations, as depicted in Figure 1 .
(1) Computes X = xP and sets a suitable number of hops to be hop, where P is a generator of G 1 , G 1 is an additive group of prime order q, x is a random number. Note that hop is depending on the actual frequency of usage.
(2) Chooses a random value m and computes the list of values where the 1st field of LRT i means the unique tag number for a route, the 2nd field records its ancestor node, the 3th field records its successor node, the 4th field records the hash chain value which is generated by the source node, and the 5th field indicates a life-time which controls how long a route is valid in LRT i . If the value of life-time hits 0, the entry will be removed from LRT i .
Path discovery phase
Nn . (4) Broadcasts a P athDiscovery packet to the neighbors within the wireless transmission range, where
(5) Stores the entry (tag#, N n , , h m , LT N 0 ) in its local route table LRT 0 . Since N 0 itself is the source of this route and no ancestor node exists, the second field records the identity of N n . Also, the third field is temporarily unknown at this point, and it would be added later during the path reverse phase. The fourth field records the hash chain value h m , and this field is used for nodes N i to verify the legitimacy of a received message, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The fifth field records the life-time of an entry on the route. The entry would be deleted if the timer hits to 0.
When a node receives the P athDiscovery packet, it will perform the following steps:
(6) Check if ((hop − −) ≥0), if it holds, continue; otherwise, stop.
(7) Check if the P athDiscovery packet has already been received from other nodes within its wireless transmission range while using the unique tag# as the unique identifier for this route. If it holds, drop it and stop; otherwise, continue.
(8) Check if the node itself is the designated receiver. There are two possible outcomes:
a. If the node is NOT the designated receiver, then it maintains its local route 
b. If the node is the intended destination for node N n , it computes
Then, N n checks whether the hash chain h N i is correct. If the hash chain value is satisfied, the P athDiscovery message is deemed valid. Finally, N n stores the following entry (tag#, N n−1 , N 0 , h m , LT Nn ) in its local route table LRT n . Since N n itself is the destination of this route and has no successor node, the third field records the identity of N 0 . The second field then records its ancestor node N n−1 , and the fourth field records the hash chain value h m . The fifth field records the life-time LT N n of an entry in the route. Upon the entry of all necessary records, the path discovery phase ends. Figure 2 illustrates the path reverse phase of our proposed payment-based routing protocol. To initiate a path reverse session, the destination node N n first initiates a path reverse procedure in the reverse direction to confirm a complete route from itself to the source node N 0 by performing the following operations. Nn is a dynamic session key between N n and N 0 .
Path reverse phase
(2) Makes a P athReverse
{ * } stands for signing {*} with the private key of node N i .
Upon receiving the P athReverse packet from N n , N n−1 deals with this packet according to following steps.
(4) Checks whether tag# exists in LRT n−1 or not. If a tag is found, continue; otherwise, stop.
Path reverse phase 
(7) According to the second field of LRT n−1 , N n−1 unicasts the packet to its ancestor node N n−2 , where packet = [tag#||RL||M P R N n ||Sig N n−1 ].
(8) Maintains its local route table LRT n−1 as LRT n−1 = (tag#, N n−2 , N n , h m , LT n−1 ).
Other intermediate nodes N i along the route will perform the same steps as the node N n−1 , where i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 3, n − 2. As a result, the last intermediate node N 1 should unicast packet = [tag#||RL||M P R N n ||Sig N 1 ] to its ancestor node N 0 and maintains its local route table
Finally, when the source node N 0 receives the packet from N 1 , it performs the following operations.
{Sig N 1 }, if it holds, continue; otherwise, stop. 
Data transfer phase with payment mechanism
During the data transfer phase, the source node N 0 pays the virtual currency called N uglets to the involved intermediate nodes N i alone the path, which is established during previous path's construction phases, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. As a result, N 0 generates n − 1 pieces of N uglets
where j denotes the transmission rounds, for 0 < j ≤ m. In addition, N 0 composes a P ayment message that contains the complete N uglets N0,Ni , the encrypted message C, and the message authentication code M AC N0 . Before transmitting these messages, N 0 encrypts them with the public keys of all the nodes along the path to the destination node. Here, we will introduce an example to describe the detailed steps of data transfer phase with payment mechanism.
In the route presented in Figure 3 , the P ayment packet, sent by the source node N 0 , contains the path {N 0 , N 1 , N 2 , N 3 } forwarded to the destination node N 3 . Suppose that N 0 wants to send a confidential message M to the destination node N 3 , N 0 would first use the common session key DSK h m = H 2 (h m−1 ). Then, with each encryption of the P ayment packet, N 0 begins to compute [C] while checking the tag#. If it is correct, N 3 gets the confidential message M ; otherwise, stop. Finally, N 1 and N 2 can use N uglets N0,N1 and N uglets N0,N2 to request N 0 to be paid for the services, respectively.
Detection of malicious behavior nodes
In order to ensure a secure networking, we should prevent the forged message from forwarding to the destination. The basic idea of detection of malicious behavior node is to integrate a hop-by-hop identification mechanism into routing protocol. During path reverse and data transfer phases, when a node on a path receives a packet from its previous one-hop node, it is unable to recognize whether the received packet is forged by malicious behavior node or not. However, the node can obtain the signature of the received packet from its previous node and further verify it. If the packet is valid, the node would generate the signature of received packet to its next one-hop node to guarantee the validity of its transmission behavior. Therefore, in our proposed protocol, internal attacks are detectable and the malicious nodes on a path could not deny their misbehavior if the forged message attacks were detected.
Security analysis
In this section, we will provide the proof that the requirements presented in Section 1 are met by our payment-based routing protocol.
Theorem 4.1: The proposed protocol is secured against the tampering attacks and maintains data nonrepudiation of the nodes that participated in MANETs including the source node, the intermediate nodes, and the destination node.
: During the path discovery phase, in a tampering attack, the attacker might tamper with the node list RL of P athDiscovery message to facilitate further attacks, such as wormhole attacks. However, these attacks can be detected with hash chains h N i = H 2 (N i ||h N i−1 ), for 0 < i ≤ n − 1. Hash chains are used in our protocol to guarantee the correctness of transmission messages. As a result, N n can confirm the completed route from itself to N 0 and tampering problems can be avoided in this phase. During the path reverse phase, all the subsequent interactions between the involved participants are well-protected by the signature
In this way, N i ensures that the received message is indeed generated by the rightful holder of its successor node N i+1 . It would be apparent if an intruder does not have the rightful signature and is attempting to cheat the participants on the route to run the path reverse phases. In addition, there is no way for attackers to tamper with the node list RL of the P athReverse message to wage security attacks, due to the protection of the message authentication code
As a result, the tampering attacks can be prevented during this phase. Likewise, during the data transfer phase, the proposed protocol uses an approach similar to the Onion Routing protocol for transmitting the P ayment message M P i , for 0 < i ≤ n − 1. Thus, starting from the source node, only the corresponding intermediate node in the route can remove one encryption layer to reveal the next P ayment information M P i+1 by computing
Moreover, all subsequent interactions between the participants involved are well-protected by the signature
, and the hash chain value h m−1 ; therefore this approach ensures both the security and non-repudiation during this phase. On the other hand, with respect to the security of virtual currency N uglets N0,Ni , since an attacker cannot obtain the hash chain value h m−1 and the private key of source node, the primary requirement for such applications is payment verification, which would lead to an identification of sources of received N uglets N 0 ,N i . As the above designed mechanism shows, the requirement of data non-repudiation and integrity can be provided in the proposed protocol. : During the path discovery phase, a source node N 0 sends the P athDiscovery message M P D N0 to the destination node N n , and the message is protected by the common shared key SK
, which is shared only between the source node and the destination node. Thus, starting from the source node, only the destination node can derive the common shared key SK 
Nn , if S ID N 0 is the correct private key of N 0 , was issued by KGC. As a result, N n can authenticate the validity of N 0 , and vice versa. Hence, the node identification is well-protected under the proposed protocol to prevent security attacks such as impersonation attacks.
During the path reverse phase, a destination node sends the P athReverse message M P R N n to the source node N 0 to confirm the completed path, which is proceeded from itself to N 0 through a number of intermediate nodes N i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. The P athReverse message M P R Nn is protected by N n 's common secret key SK to verify the authenticity of received messages. If the above situation holds, not only the path from N 0 to N n would be confirmed, but also a dynamic session key DSK
between of them will be established. Since no one has the ability to acquire and derive the static shared key between N 0 and N n ; as a result, the impersonation attacks can be resisted in MANETs in our proposed protocol. 
(1)
In
Step (8b) (1) and (2) are satisfied, and together they accomplish the mutual authentication and dynamic session key establishment in the proposed protocol.
On the other hand, with respect to forward secrecy, we have assumed that an attacker collects X's contribution aP and Y 's contribution bP during path discovery phase and path reverse phase, respectively. He/she still cannot derive the dynamic session key K ab , because such process is as difficult as solving the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) (Barreto and Kim, 2002) ; and thus our proposed protocol provides perfect forward secrecy.
Conclusion
In this article, a secure routing protocol with payment mechanism that prevents node selfishness for mobile ad hoc networks, is proposed. By comparison with other related schemes, the proposed protocol not only demonstrates beneficial and sought after properties (e.g., low computational costs, establishment of dynamic session keys, mutual authentication, data non-repudiation), but also provides the advantage of node cooperation encouragement. Hence, a source node can securely send a confidential message to the source node through a number of intermediate nodes while each involved intermediate node will receive a service fee N uglets for his/her transmission service. Most importantly, in this way, the proposed protocol takes advantage of not only protecting a node from stop forwarding attacks by the selfish nodes, but also restrains the nodes from sending useless packets into networks and thus prevents networks from packet flooding attacks. Finally, a node could still become selfish if it has enough nuggets to transfer its own packets.
In the future research, we planned to investigate how to design a dynamic reputation algorithm into the proposed protocol regarding the issues of these nodes' behaviors. Moreover, a formal security proof and a experimental simulation would have been a better picture to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed protocol.
